I.S. Koroma
President Julius Maada Bio’s call for “renewed national dialogue on adopting proportional representation, not just for parliamentary elections, but across the executive and public sector” for Sierra Leone follows the 2023 implementation of proportional representation for parliamentary elections. This proposal has prompted concerns from the opposition All People’s Congress (APC) regarding potential chaos and the undermining of democratic governance. In this piece, I will attempt to analyze historical precedents of power-sharing arrangements to identify factors contributing to their success and catastrophic failure, providing crucial insights for Sierra Leone’s proposed reforms.
A key finding from this analysis is that power-sharing arrangements can function effectively as transitional mechanisms but rarely succeed as permanent solutions, particularly when they eliminate meaningful political opposition or create institutional paralysis. Sierra Leone’s current situation, with the 2023 parliamentary elections resulting in a contested outcome and an initial boycott by the APC, underscores the need for careful consideration of such reforms. The concern about creating a de facto one-party state is valid, given that only the two major parties (SLPP and APC) consistently achieve significant representation under the current proportional representation system. There is a bigger issue; the antecedents of Bio’s violent tenure in office that analysts are afraid to talk about. A recent Tripartite Committee nation-wide consultation revealed that the overwhelming majority of citizens reject any form of proportional representation in the country. Bio is attempting to undermine that outcome in favor of a potentially calamitous so-called executive power-sharing enterprise.
Examining successful power-sharing models, such as South Africa’s post-apartheid Government of National Unity (1994-1996), reveals the importance of a transitional design with clear timelines and external guarantees. Northern Ireland’s fragile but persistent system, established by the Good Friday Agreement (1998-present), highlights the role of external enforcement and mutual veto mechanisms. Belgium’s long-standing consociational power-sharing (1918-present) demonstrates that deep constitutional entrenchment, economic interdependence, and gradual evolution are vital for institutional success. Conversely, catastrophic failures in Cyprus (1960-1963) and Lebanon (1943-1975, and post-Taif 1989-present) illustrate the dangers of rigid quotas, demographic changes, external interference, and institutional inflexibility, often leading to civil war, paralysis, and corruption. For Sierra Leone, any proposed power-sharing must learn from these historical lessons, prioritizing the preservation of genuine opposition and avoiding structures that lead to governmental dysfunction or the erosion of democratic principles.
Lessons from Success and Failure – An Analysis for Sierra Leone’s Proposed Reforms
Context: Sierra Leone’s Current Situation
Sierra Leone has recently seen the implementation of proportional representation for its parliamentary elections. In 1996 and 2002, when proportional representation was first introduced after a constitutional amendment by the addition of section 38A, it was forced by the civil war because the country could not be delimited into the constituencies envisaged in the 1991 constitution. The preference is a first-past-the-post. The country attained peace in 2002, and the country was returned to that system in the 2007, 2012 and 2018 elections. In 2018 for instance, APC won 68 parliamentary seats before 10 were kicked out and were replaced by SLPP members in what became known as the ‘‘the first sin’’ of the Bio administration.’’ SLPP won 49, C4C won all 8 Kono seats and NGC won 4 seats in Kambia. 3 independent candidates won their elections too. Bio made a last-minute reversal and announced that the 2023 elections were to be conducted by PR system. The Supreme Court in a recent decision held that, proportional representation was an alternative to first-past-the-post. In those elections, SLPP secured 81 seats, while the APC won 54 seats. All other incumbents lost their seats. It is now a two-party parliament. These last elections, however, were not without controversy, as the APC initially contested the results and boycotted participation in parliament due to alleged electoral irregularities. A national unity agreement was subsequently brokered by international bodies, including the African Union, ECOWAS, and the Commonwealth, which led to the end of the APC’s boycott.
The current political landscape in Sierra Leone raises concerns about the potential for a de facto one-party state, especially if proportional representation is extended to the executive and public sector. Historically, only the two dominant parties, the SLPP and the APC, have managed to achieve substantial representation in both local councils and parliament. This trend suggests that smaller political parties face significant challenges in gaining representation under the existing proportional representation system, which could be further exacerbated by expanded power-sharing arrangements. Such a scenario could lead to a lack of meaningful political opposition, potentially undermining the country’s peace and democratic governance. The political analyses in Sierra Leone highlight the significance of patronage networks as a source of political power.
Successful Power-Sharing Examples
In almost all cases, executive power-sharing has only worked as a makeshift arrangement for transitional administrations following a dispute or crisis: South Africa (1994-1996), Sudan (2005), Liberia (2003), Burundi (2001, 2005), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Kenya (2008), Zimbabwe (2008), Afghanistan (2001), Ivory Coast (2003). I will discuss few of the relevant ones.
- South Africa (1994-1996): Transitional Success
South Africa implemented a Government of National Unity from 1994 to 1996 as it transitioned from apartheid to democracy. This power-sharing structure mandated that all parties securing more than 5% of the parliamentary seats would receive cabinet portfolios. Furthermore, parties that garnered over 20% of the seats were granted vice-presidencies. This arrangement was highly regarded by Arend Lijphart, a leading theorist on power-sharing.
The success of this model was largely attributed to its design as a transitional mechanism. It was explicitly understood by all parties that the arrangement was temporary, aimed at facilitating a peaceful shift away from apartheid. International support and monitoring also played a crucial role by providing credibility to the process. The clear timeline of this transitional phase ensured that parties understood the temporary nature of their roles. Although the National Party withdrew from the government in 1996, the arrangement successfully guided South Africa through a peaceful democratic transition. However, the National Party’s involvement in this power-sharing structure “stifled the early development of substantial political opposition,” which consequently slowed the pace of democratic consolidation.
- Northern Ireland (1998-Present): Fragile but Persistent
The Good Friday Agreement, established in 1998, set up a cross-community power-sharing system in Northern Ireland. Key features include joint First Minister and Deputy First Minister positions, held by a unionist and a nationalist, respectively, with equal powers. A multi-party executive is determined using the d’Hondt system, ensuring proportional representation in government.
This system’s endurance is due to several factors, including the consistent external enforcement by both the British and Irish governments. The principle of mutual veto, where one First Minister cannot exist without the other, effectively prevents domination by a single community. Furthermore, a clear constitutional framework legally embeds these rules, providing a stable foundation. Despite these safeguards, the system has demonstrated its fragility by collapsing and being restored multiple times.
- Belgium (1918-Present): Institutional Success
Belgium has successfully operated a consociational power-sharing system since 1918, effectively managing tensions between its Dutch-speaking Flemings and French-speaking Walloons. This enduring model is characterized by deep institutional embedding within its constitutional framework.
Factors contributing to its success include the constitutional entrenchment of its power-sharing mechanisms and significant economic interdependence among the different linguistic communities, which foster shared interests. The system’s gradual evolution over many decades, rather than being suddenly imposed, has also been critical to its stability.
Catastrophic Failures of Power-Sharing
- Cyprus (1960-1963): Constitutional Collapse
The 1960 Cyprus Constitution mandated a rigid 7:3 ratio between Greek and Turkish Cypriot ministers, alongside complex veto systems. This structure, intended to ensure representation, instead created inflexibility and fueled resentment between the communities. The predetermined ethnic ratios proved unworkable when the communities could not reach agreement, leading to a constitutional crisis. External interference from Greece and Turkey further destabilized the arrangements. The failure of power-sharing in Cyprus in the early 1960s ultimately led to decades of division and eventual partition.
- Lebanon (1943-1975): The First National Pact Collapse
Lebanon’s independence leaders established the 1943 National Pact, which created proportional representation among Maronite Christians, Shiite Muslims, and Sunni Muslims in key governmental positions. This arrangement initially succeeded in managing sectarian tensions.
However, the system ultimately failed due to internal rigidities that proved vulnerable to regional destabilization, particularly with demographic changes over time. External pressures, such as the Palestinian presence and broader regional conflicts, overwhelmed the power-sharing framework. The institutionalization of confessional politics itself became a source of dissension due to its inflexibility. This collapse led to a civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990, resulting in an estimated 150,000 fatalities and the displacement of nearly one million people.
- Lebanon Post-Taif (1989-Present): Ongoing Dysfunction
Following its civil war, Lebanon’s 1989 Ta’if Accord reinstated many of the 1943-1975 National Pact arrangements, replacing the earlier 6:5 Christian bias with parity in representation.
Despite these reforms, Lebanon faces ongoing institutional paralysis. For instance, the country has been without a president since Michel Aoun’s term ended in October 2022, and it experienced a two-and-a-half-year leadership gap between 2014 and 2016. Widespread corruption and ineffective governance have sparked protests, with many Lebanese opposing the confessional system, viewing it as a mechanism for institutionalizing sectarianism and clientelism. Furthermore, Lebanon’s economy has contracted by 34% since 2019, leading to “the most devastating, multi-pronged crisis in its modern history”.
Iraq Post-2003: Sectarian Quotas and Instability
After 2003, a system of sectarian quotas for government positions was imposed in Iraq. This system, however, inadvertently emphasized sectarian identities rather than fostering national unity.
Iraqi protesters have consistently voiced concerns that this sectarian quota system fuels corruption. The resulting power-sharing arrangements have been criticized for their role in disastrous governance failings and perpetuating corruption.
Critical Analysis: When Power-Sharing Works vs. Fails Success Factors
Several critical factors contribute to the successful implementation and endurance of power-sharing arrangements. Primarily, the transitional nature of such systems is crucial. Many successful power-sharing models, like South Africa’s post-apartheid government, are explicitly temporary, designed to guide a nation through a specific period of political transition. Alternatively, systems like Belgium’s have evolved gradually over decades, adapting to changing societal dynamics rather than being static.
External guarantees also play a significant role. Strong international backing and robust enforcement mechanisms provide credibility and stability, particularly in post-conflict environments, as seen in Northern Ireland. Additionally, economic incentives are vital; for power-sharing to be sustainable, all participating groups must derive tangible economic benefits from cooperation.
The presence of flexible institutions allows a system to adapt to evolving circumstances without precipitating a constitutional crisis. This adaptability is crucial for long-term viability.
Finally, successful arrangements must preserve genuine opposition space, ensuring that meaningful political competition can continue, which is essential for democratic health.
Failure Indicators
Conversely, several indicators point to the potential failure of power-sharing arrangements. The permanent exclusion of opposition is a significant risk. When power-sharing “stifles the development of substantial political opposition,” it hinders democratic consolidation and can lead to instability.
Rigid quotas, especially those based on ethnic predetermination, create inflexibility and can generate resentment. Arend Lijphart, a proponent of power-sharing, favors “ethnicity-blind” arrangements over fixed quotas to avoid these pitfalls. Such inflexible systems often lead to institutional paralysis, particularly when they mandate consensus on all issues, making governance unwieldy or impossible, as observed in Lebanon.
Corruption incentives are another major concern. Elite bargaining without adequate accountability can “fuel corruption and lead to disastrous governance failings,” eroding public trust and undermining the legitimacy of the government. Finally, external manipulation, where foreign powers exploit internal divisions, can severely destabilize power-sharing arrangements, as seen in Cyprus and Lebanon.
Implications for Sierra Leone Risks of Bio’s Proposal
The proposal to extend proportional representation to the executive and public sector in Sierra Leone is contextually an abnormality and it carries several risks, particularly concerning democratic regression. Such a move could potentially eliminate meaningful opposition voices, creating a scenario that the APC and other analysts fear: a recipe for chaos through one-party domination. The existing political environment in Sierra Leone already suffers from “over-centralization of power and resources,” which exacerbates existing divisions within the country. Expanding power-sharing without addressing this underlying issue of violence, corruption, governance accountability etc. could further entrench an imbalance of power.
Furthermore, historical precedents raise significant concerns. Most power-sharing arrangements in executive branches have either ultimately failed (e.g., Cyprus, Lebanon) or been explicitly abandoned after serving a transitional purpose (e.g., South Africa). These cases suggest that implementing such a system as a permanent solution could lead to chronic instability and dysfunction. The executive branch in various European countries is undergoing a gradual transformation, with an almost continuous expansion of executive power within the EU political system. This development is not always transparent and is not subject to a comprehensive system of checks and balances.
Potential Benefits
Despite the risks, some form of inclusive governance might offer potential benefits, particularly in preventing conflict, given the “deep ethnic and political divisions” that “persist in Sierra Leone”. If meticulously designed as a temporary measure with clear exit strategies, power-sharing could facilitate democratic consolidation by ensuring broader representation during a critical period. This approach would aim to bridge existing divides without institutionalizing them indefinitely. The opportunity presented by post 2018 and 2023 elections could have been a good experimentation for people to see but President Bio saw no need for it.
Sierra Leone’s political and economic performance over the past 25years has defied expectations, despite its history of civil war, chronic poverty, and corrupt governance. The country has seen positive post-war recovery, evidenced by an upward trend in economic performance but with serious challenges in the last decade. Political reforms after the war included the restoration of multiparty democracy and the re-establishment of local government after more than 30 years.
With Sierra Leone’s president acting as Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), his controversial leadership may be salvaged by expert advice that puts the country first rather than his political survival or safety post presidency. The country is not in the same political crisis as was post 2018 and 2023 elections. No country has succeeded with a permanent executive power sharing in a democracy. Granted that Bio’s rhetoric has fueled division in the country especially when he described the APC as ‘‘bad for Sierra Leone’’ and the chairman of his SLPP doubling down by calling members of the opposition ‘‘mad men.’’ Bio has not prioritized accountability for post-election crimes against APC members across the country or violence against civilians. His admission that he cannot help his people in the middle of unprecedented economic challenges cannot be settled by a power-sharing arrangement. As executive president, Bio has authority to share power with any Sierra Leonean at any time. He could even appoint a new cabinet today with the major from opposition parties but he has not even tried to do so. Instead, his administration is using a technical phrase as a proposal to resolve political tensions. Analysts have argued that Bio has a genuine reason to want his party to share power with the opposition after his tenure. He understands the overwhelming strength in the winner-takes-all presidency. One will hope that such experience could help him leave a better legacy than a country on a power-sharing time-bomb even if for selfish reasons.
Recommendations
Given the complexities and historical lessons, several recommendations emerge for Sierra Leone’s proposed reforms. Any power-sharing arrangement should be constitutionally embedded with explicit rules and defined timelines. This clarity would provide a stable framework and prevent ambiguity. Crucially, the design must preserve opposition space to ensure that power-sharing does not eliminate the ability of opposition parties to provide meaningful oversight and competition.
A gradual implementation approach, rather than a wholesale adoption, could be more prudent, potentially piloting arrangements in specific sectors to assess their effectiveness and identify unforeseen challenges. Securing international support with credible external guarantees and monitoring mechanisms is also vital, offering a layer of accountability and legitimacy.
Finally, the reforms must fundamentally address underlying accountability and economic issues and resource distribution that fuel political tensions. Constitutional and legal reforms are needed to address divisions stemming from the over-centralization of power and resources. Focusing solely on power-sharing without tackling these root causes will likely prove unsustainable in the long run.
Conclusion
The historical record unequivocally demonstrates that power-sharing arrangements within executive branches rarely succeed as permanent solutions for democratic governance. While such arrangements can serve as valuable transitional mechanisms, as seen in South Africa, or function in unique cultural contexts like Belgium, they more frequently lead to institutional paralysis, as experienced in Lebanon, fuel corruption in countries like Iraq, or result in complete constitutional collapse, as was the case in Cyprus.
For Sierra Leone, the fundamental question extends beyond merely whether power-sharing can work; it centers on whether such reforms genuinely address the underlying drivers of political instability. These drivers include the “over-centralization of power and resources” and the urgent need for “constitutional and legal reforms” that foster authentic democratic competition, rather than merely facilitating elite bargaining.
The concerns raised by political analysts regarding potential chaos are well-founded when viewed through the lens of international experience. However, if a power-sharing system is meticulously designed as a transitional arrangement, incorporating robust safeguards for democratic competition and clear timelines for its evolution towards conventional democratic governance, it might effectively meet Sierra Leone’s immediate stability needs while protecting its future democratic trajectory. The critical lesson from failed arrangements is stark: any system that suppresses meaningful political opposition in the guise of inclusion ultimately fails to be neither inclusive nor sustainable.
Dr. Ibrahim Sorie Koroma is a law and policy expert, author and researcher who works in Africa, Asia, Europe and the United State of America. The opinions expressed in this piece are not a reflection of those of any institution he works for or group he belongs to.
